Rules, Choice and Strategy

Rules, Choice and Strategy

The Political Economy of Italian Electoral Reform

The Locke Institute series

Ram Mudambi, Pietro Maria Navarra and Giuseppe Sobbrio

This topical book analyses the change of electoral rules in Italy from proportional representation toward plurality. While Italy is used as the illustrative case, the analysis has far-ranging theoretical and practical implications, and will therefore be of interest to academics and researchers of political economy, constitutionalism and public choice.

Introduction

Ram Mudambi, Pietro Maria Navarra and Giuseppe Sobbrio

Subjects: economics and finance, public choice theory, politics and public policy, public choice

Extract

Once the electoral properties of alternative electoral rules have been compared and the choice amongst them has been made, the selected system constrains political behaviour on both sides of the electoral equation: the demand side (voters) and the supply side (political parties and coalitions). In this part of the study, choices subject to the electoral rules selected for the Italian national election are investigated. Specifically, two issues are analysed and studied in this part of the volume. First, we focus on the party strategies adopted in Italy in response to the change when the electoral rules moved from proportional representation towards plurality. Second, we attempt to measure the electoral costs imposed on political coalitions by constituent parties in the light of particular features of the new rules for the election of members of the Chamber of Deputies. While Italy is used as an illustrative case, the analysis has far-ranging theoretical and practical implications. 133