Competition in the Provision of Local Public Goods

Competition in the Provision of Local Public Goods

Single Function Jurisdictions and Individual Choice

Studies in Fiscal Federalism and State–local Finance series

Alexandra Petermann Reifschneider

The central purpose of this book is to analyse the optimal allocation of local public goods or services (for example garbage collection, police, fire brigades and medical services) in large urban agglomerations and the allocation consequences of increasing competition in the provision of them. Competition in the Provision of Local Public Goods uses two innovative aspects present in the concept of Functional Overlapping Competing Jurisdictions, which are de-localized membership and uni-functionality of jurisdictions. The book analyses the effect of these two aspects on competition among jurisdictions and the impact this probable increase in competition may have on the achievement of the optimal allocation of local public goods.

Chapter 1: Maximum Lot-Size Regulation

Alexandra Petermann Reifschneider

Subjects: economics and finance, public finance, services


No extract available

You are not authenticated to view the full text of this chapter or article.

Elgaronline requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books or journals. Please login through your library system or with your personal username and password on the homepage.

Non-subscribers can freely search the site, view abstracts/ extracts and download selected front matter and introductory chapters for personal use.

Your library may not have purchased all subject areas. If you are authenticated and think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

Further information