Post Keynesian Econometrics, Microeconomics and the Theory of the Firm

Post Keynesian Econometrics, Microeconomics and the Theory of the Firm

Beyond Keynes, Volume One

Edited by Shelia C. Dow and John Hillard

This is the first of two volumes celebrating Keynes’s contribution to economics, and the development of post Keynesian economics in recent years. It reinstates the importance of Keynesian economics and its revival since the end of the 1980s, and the book’s authoritative chapters are presented by an outstanding group of international contributors.

Chapter 10: Speculation and reasonableness: a non-Bayesian theory of rationality

Anna Carabelli

Subjects: economics and finance, econometrics, post-keynesian economics


Anna Carabelli1 I INTRODUCTION In the recent discussion on financial markets two main currents have crossed. One revives Keynes’s discussion on speculation and liquidity preference and the connection between these concepts and uncertainty and probability in A Treatise on Probability (TP). The other derives from Bayesian theory and focuses on situations which generate paradoxes and anomalies of rational behaviour in financial markets considered ‘efficient’, namely situations which give rise to situations of uncertainty à la Keynes, Knight and Shackle. The first current analyses the rationality or irrationality of speculative behaviour and liquidity preference and the role of conventions in financial markets. In various ways this opposes the explanation of financial markets as efficient markets and reconnects with Victoria Chick’s idea that Keynes’s liquidity and speculation find no place in Keynesian theory or in Tobin who, in Chick’s view, reduces uncertainty to calculable risk (Chick, 1983: 214–16). These studies are also linked to a Post Keynesian view of uncertainty based upon non-measurable probabilities. Many authors have recently analysed Keynes’s contribution to the analysis of financial markets – often in a critical manner. These include Cottrell, Davis, Lawlor, Mini, Pratten, Runde and Winslow and are all connected to the discussion of the role and relevance of TP in the interpretation of Keynes’s method in economics. They raise two main questions pertinent to this paper: in the General Theory, is Keynes adopting a subjectivist Bayesian probability or a logical probability in line with the TP? Secondly, is he defending a notion of...

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