Institutions in Crisis

Institutions in Crisis

European Perspectives on the Recession

New Thinking in Political Economy series

Edited by David Howden

This critical and thought-provoking book explores the causes and consequences of Europe’s failed political and economic institutions. Europe’s recession has created new challenges as market turmoil has shaken the foundations of the twin pillars of the new drive for European integration – political and monetary unions. This book critically assesses the patchwork solutions continually offered to hold the troubled unions together. Failed political policies, from the prodigious ‘Common Agricultural Policy’ to ever more common fiscal stimulus packages, are shown to have bred less than stellar results in the past, and to have devastating implications for future European growth. The contributors outline the manner through which European monetary union has subsidized and continues to exacerbate the burgeoning debt crisis. Most strikingly, the interplay between Europe’s political and economic realms is exposed as the boondoggle it is, with increasingly bureaucratic institutions plaguing the continent and endangering future potential.

Chapter 5: Europe’s Crisis of Accounting

Maria Alvarado, Laura Muro and Kirk Lee Tennant

Subjects: economics and finance, austrian economics, political economy, politics and public policy, political economy


Maria Alvarado, Laura Muro and Kirk Lee Tennant Since the European financial crisis began, the reaction has mainly been political. Following political pressure, financial institutions such as the European Central Bank (ECB) and the individual national central banks that comprise the Eurosystem instigated policies aimed at stemming the tide of unemployment through deficit spending. The ECB facilitated this greatly by an expansive monetary policy that accepted increasing amounts of Eurozone government debt under less stringent collateral requirements than before the crisis emerged (Bagus and Howden, 2009a; 2009b). In addition to these early monetary and fiscal responses, European politicians were some of the earliest proponents of regulatory changes to the financial industry. Talk of compensation and bonus limits for bankers became common place (especially in the United Kingdom), while increasing regulatory constraints in collateral and financing operations were rushed through.1 Politically speaking, the proposed accounting rule changes were to accomplish two purposes. First, accounting data were to be reported in a manner that better represented the underlying substance of the economic transactions. Second, and more importantly, the new rules were to enact regulatory changes that would affect both the microeconomic and macroeconomic behavior of the financial markets. No matter what position one takes with regard to the proposed and adopted changes to accounting rules, a strong caveat must be attached to their effectiveness. The measurement of the effects of these changes is dependent on the ability of the proposed rule changes to affect microeconomic and macroeconomic behavior quickly. Measurement must be...

You are not authenticated to view the full text of this chapter or article.

Elgaronline requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books or journals. Please login through your library system or with your personal username and password on the homepage.

Non-subscribers can freely search the site, view abstracts/ extracts and download selected front matter and introductory chapters for personal use.

Your library may not have purchased all subject areas. If you are authenticated and think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

Further information