Table of Contents

Handbook of Multilevel Finance

Handbook of Multilevel Finance

Edited by Ehtisham Ahmad and Giorgio Brosio

This Handbook explores and explains new developments in the “second generation” theory of public finance, in which benevolent rulers and governments have been replaced by personally motivated politicians and the associated institutions. Following a comprehensive introduction by the editors, the renowned contributors present fresh and original perspectives on the key multi-level issues, along with recent developments in theory and practice, as they relate to taxes, budget systems, the management of liabilities and macroeconomic stability. The book also explores special issues concerning the poor and marginalized, structural change and the environment, natural disasters, and the task of overcoming conflicts whilst keeping countries together.

Chapter 5: Geografiscal federalism

Federico Revelli

Subjects: economics and finance, public finance, public sector economics


In the past two decades, public economists have increasingly employed spatial econometrics techniques to investigate the phenomenon of horizontal and vertical competition among governments in multi-tiered public sector structures. The use of geographical concepts and methods in empirical work on fiscal federalism – geografiscal federalism – is justified by the idea that space is an important aspect of multi-tiered fiscal arrangements, as witnessed by the plethora of theoretical work based on the two most prominent spatial concepts in public economics – Oates’ decentralization theorem and the Tiebout sorting mechanism – as well as by the common finding that decentralized fiscal policies tend to exhibit positive spatial autocorrelation. As discussed in Revelli (2006), the mainstream view among applied public economists through the 1990s and the early 2000s was that spatial econometrics provided powerful tools to identify substantive strategic interaction among decentralized decision-makers, and promised to be able to discriminate economically relevant processes of competition (substantive interaction) from the physiological correlation in local government budgetary data that is mechanically driven by purely geographical factors that have no behavioral significance (omitted variables in the empirical model). In addition, applied public economists have for over a decade set themselves the ambitious task of identifying the root cause of interaction, that is, determining what kind of economic process is at work when local policies exhibit spatial autocorrelation: tax competition, yardstick competition, or benefit spillovers from decentralized provision of public services.

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