Private Property and Takings Compensation

Private Property and Takings Compensation

Theoretical Framework and Empirical Analysis

Yun-chien Chang

This innovative volume offers a thorough breakdown of the issues surrounding takings compensation – payments made as reimbursement for government takeover of private property. Using examples from New York City and Taiwan, Yun-chien Chang discusses the advantages and disadvantages of different methods of compensation and offers insightful suggestions for future implementation.

Chapter 2: Condemnors: three behavioral theories

Yun-chien Chang

Subjects: economics and finance, law and economics, law - academic, law and economics, politics and public policy, public policy

Extract

Condemnors are usually assumed to be government officials. The literature proposes three widely different theories about these officials’ incentives: the benevolent theory; the fiscal illusion theory; and the political interest theory. This chapter reviews the prior literature and critiques the first two theories, concluding that the last theory is more plausible.

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