Theoretical Framework and Empirical Analysis
Chapter 5: Taiwan 1977–2009 and condemnors’ incentives
This chapter conducts a case study of Taiwan’s takings compensation practices starting in 1977. In Taiwan, takings compensation is determined by official land value (which systematically deviates from fair market value) plus certain bonus compensation at local governments’ discretion. By analyzing how local governments set official land value and the bonus compensation, this chapter ascertains whether local governments maximize political interests or minimize takings compensation—that is, whether the fiscal illusion theory or the political interest theory is supported by empirical evidence. In addition, Taiwan’s post-1977 regime implements the ex ante assessment by non-landowners method. The empirical analysis here can examine whether this method produces accurate assessments of property value.
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