Theoretical Framework and Empirical Analysis
Chapter 6: Taiwan 1954–77 and condemnees’ incentives
This chapter empirically examines Taiwan’s ex ante self-assessment regime implemented in 1954–77, under which both property taxes and takings compensation are determined by landowner’s self-reported property value. Taiwan seems to be the only jurisdiction that has implemented a self-assessment regime of any kind and leaves enough data for empirical evaluation of the accuracy of such assessments. Taiwan’s regime is close to the ideal-type model described in Chapter 4; thus, this chapter can also test my theoretical claim that landowners will tend to underassess when the property tax rate is higher than the probability of takings.
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