Table of Contents

The Goals of Competition Law

The Goals of Competition Law

ASCOLA Competition Law series

Edited by Daniel Zimmer

What are the normative foundations of competition law? That is the question at the heart of this book. Leading scholars consider whether this branch of law serves just one or more than one goal, and, if it serves to protect unfettered competition as such, how this goal relates to other objectives such as the promotion of economic welfare.

Chapter 14: Antitrust Pluralism and Justice

Abayomi Al-Ameen

Subjects: economics and finance, law and economics, law - academic, competition and antitrust law, law and economics


Abayomi Al-Ameen* INTRODUCTION Theories are extremely important or else antitrust law will make no sense.1 However, theories themselves do not guarantee us perfection in antitrust. We must not lose sight of the fact that even with qualitative exposition on antitrust, the divergence of theoretical insights through which competition issues are addressed gives to antitrust institutions both pain and gain with equal measure: the continued debates between and about the relevant theories afford robustness for antitrust itself2 but at the same time, the intensity of such debates often leaves antitrust in a state of delirium. In order to reduce the conceptual problems in antitrust, I propose a change in the paradigm of antitrust analysis by making a modest contribution to the understanding and implementation of antitrust theory and practice. The theme of this chapter is that it may be better to expound and decide on antitrust cases on the basis of what individuals value and desire.3 Thus, since the interests of individuals are bound to differ, insti* Ph.D. candidate, Swansea University, UK. I thank Professor Jukka Snell and Dr Bebhinn Donnelly for their support. I am also grateful to the participants of the ASCOLA conference particularly Professor Eleanor Fox for her invaluable advice. 1 J Drexl, L Idot and J Monéger (eds) Economic Theory and Competition Law (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2009), vii. Note that the proposal made in this chapter is limited to the behavioral aspect of antitrust that is, Arts 101 and 102 TFEU. 2 Some of such vital...

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