Law and Economics Approaches to Bid Rigging
New Horizons in Competition Law and Economics series
Chapter 8: Application of auction theory in China
The previous section has shown that law and economics theory suggests that Chinese legislation is not well designed to prevent bid rigging conspiracies. This chapter analyses how far the public procurement legislation in China follows auction theoretic insights in order to determine if there are ways in which auction theory could help to prevent cartel formation and cartel stability. Both issues are discussed in turn.
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