Law and Economics Approaches to Bid Rigging
New Horizons in Competition Law and Economics series
Chapter 9: The effectiveness of the legal regime applicable to bid rigging in Japan
This chapter analyses whether the legal framework governing bid rigging conspiracies in Japan deals effectively with them so as to allow government entities to procure at competitive prices. It thereby draws upon the law and economics insights presented earlier in this book regarding optimal deterrence. It measures the current legal framework against the law and economics findings and examines whether the incentives created are sufficient to induce bidders to comply with the law. This approach is necessary since there is no hard empirical evidence available that confirms that bid rigging conspiracies in Japan are widespread and inflict considerable damage upon society. Anecdotal evidence reported earlier, which suggests a general dissatisfaction with the price level and the quality procured, is therefore complemented by this theoretic treatment.
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