Cartels, Competition and Public Procurement

Cartels, Competition and Public Procurement

Law and Economics Approaches to Bid Rigging

New Horizons in Competition Law and Economics series

Stefan E. Weishaar

Stefan Weishaar explores the ways in which economic theory can be used to mitigate the adverse effects of bid rigging cartels. The study sheds light on one of the vital issues for achieving cost-effective public procurement – which is itself a critical question in the context of the global financial crisis. The book comprehensively examines whether different laws deal effectively with bid rigging and the ways in which economic theory can be used to mitigate the adverse effects of such cartels. The employed industrial economics and auction theory highlights shortcomings of the law in all three jurisdictions – the European Union, China and Japan – and seeks to raise the awareness of policymakers as to when extra precautionary measures against bid rigging conspiracies should be taken.

Appendix 3: History of Japanese antitrust legislation

Stefan E. Weishaar

Subjects: economics and finance, competition policy, law and economics, public finance, law - academic, competition and antitrust law, law and economics, politics and public policy, public policy


The Japanese anti-monopoly law (AML) has been developing considerably since its enactment. While, over long periods of time, it was subject to dormant enforcement and weakening reforms, in recent years it has broken free from outside pressures. This chapter seeks to present insightful background information to allow for a better understanding of the current enforcement context and the degree of independence achieved by the enforcement authority. In this chapter careful consideration will be given to the relevant industrial policy as institutionalized by the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) and the political developments to the extent that they are conducive to foster a better understanding of the process of emancipation by the JFTC. The chapter is divided into five time periods: the occupation era, and developments in the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s and the 1980s. In view of its persistent and heavy American influence, the occupation era represents a special period in the development of Japanese antitrust. Reflecting both American objectives and Japanese antipathy towards the AML, this part presents the gradual “japanification” of the law or, more positively speaking, its dismantling reforms. Because of their central role in Japan’s economy, particular consideration will be paid to the dissolution of control agencies and zaibatsu.

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