Edited by Albert A. Foer and Randy M. Stutz
Introduction: Benefits of Private Enforcement: Empirical Background
Introduction: Benefits of private enforcement1 Robert H. Lande2 The purpose and design of the AAI private enforcement study Results of the study: Compensation Results of the study: Deterrence 1. Deterrence from the DOJ criminal anti-cartel enforcement program 2. Deterrence from private antitrust litigation Were the private actions good cases? Conclusions Many commentators, especially members of the defense bar, have criticized the existing United States system of private antitrust litigation. Some assert that private actions all too often result in remedies that provide lucrative fees for plaintiffs’ lawyers but secure no significant benefits for overcharged victims.3 Others suggest that private litigation merely follows an easy trail blazed by government enforcers and adds little of public benefit to government sanctions.4 Yet others contend that, in light of government enforcement, 1 This chapter is a condensation and revision of two articles by Robert H. Lande & Joshua P. Davis: Benefits From Private Antitrust Enforcement: An Analysis of Forty Cases, 42 USF. L. Rev. 879 (2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1090661 [hereinafter Benefits: An Analysis], and Comparative Deterrence from Private Enforcement and Criminal Enforcement of the U.S. Antitrust laws, 2010 BYU L. Rev. 315 (2011), available at http:// papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1565693 [hereinafter Comparative Deterrence]. For summaries of the individual case studies analyzed in this article, see Benefits from Antitrust Private Antitrust Enforcement: Forty Individual Case Studies, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. cfm?abstract_id=1105523 [hereinafter Benefits: Individual Case Studies]. 2 Venable Professor of Law, University of Baltimore Law School; Board of Directors, American...