Technology Market Transactions

Technology Market Transactions

Auctions, Intermediaries and Innovation

Frank Tietze

Frank Tietze delivers an in-depth discussion of the impact of empirical results upon transaction cost theory, and in so doing, provides the means for better understanding technology transaction processes in general, and auctions in particular. Substantiating transaction cost theory with empirical auction data, the author goes on to explore how governance structures need to be designed for effective distributed innovation processes. He concludes that the auction mechanism is a viable transaction model, and illustrates that the auction design, as currently operated by market intermediaries, requires thorough adjustments. Various options for possible improvements are subsequently prescribed.

Chapter 12: Conclusions, Implications, and Research Recommendations

Frank Tietze

Subjects: economics and finance, economics of innovation, intellectual property, innovation and technology, economics of innovation, intellectual property, technology and ict


12.1 CONCLUSIONS For various reasons (for example, the increasing complexity of technical products and intensified competition), firms have recently started to open up their innovation processes beyond the own firm boundaries. When innovating openly, firms engage in transactions on the MfTI where they trade ideas (that is in an early stage of the innovation process) as well as patents, licenses, and technologies. Some firms act on the demand side and acquire technologies externally, other firms exploit their technologies externally, acting on the supply side, and some firms might do both. However, when entering the MfTI, firms often lack the internal capabilities to govern transactions efficiently. Furthermore, the institutional framework is still rich with many obstacles that prohibit efficient transactions, which leads to high transaction costs. This study is concerned with novel transaction models developed by technology market intermediaries (TMI) and whether or not they can improve the efficiency of technology transactions primarily through the reduction of transaction costs. This study particularly emphasizes the auction model. The results of two qualitative studies show that the structure of technology auction processes fits the three core phases of the Lichtenthaler (2006b) model for external technology exploitation projects. Accordingly, three phases can be distinguished in the auction process structure. Each is distinguished by a key event: 1. Pre-auction (planning) phase: Initiated by the auction announcement. It includes the registration of sellers and the submission of their technology proposals, as well as the internal evaluation of technologies through the auction firm. 2. Bidding (negotiation) phase:...

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