Chapter 3: How lawyers are regulated
In the previous chapter the traditional and economic cases for regulating lawyers and thereby markets for legal services were presented. It was argued that self-regulation on its own could lead to the ultimate form of regulatory capture. The solution to such a problem was posited to be regulatory competition. However, that chapter did not deal in detail with the problems that might arise from monopolistic self-regulation. The present chapter remedies this deficiency by providing an economic evaluation of the instruments which have been used as a means of regulating legal professionals. Professional self-regulatory bodies have used a number of instruments to regulate the behaviour of the professionals whom they regulate. Many commentators have identified these instruments as working against the public interest.
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