Table of Contents

Constitutional Economics and Public Institutions

Constitutional Economics and Public Institutions

New Thinking in Political Economy series

Edited by Francisco Cabrillo and Miguel A. Puchades-Navarro

This extensive book explores in detail a wide range of topics within the public choice and constitutional political economy tradition, providing a comprehensive overview of current work across the field.

Chapter 3: Economics governance in the European Union: a problem of legitimacy

Francisco Cabrillo and Sean Fitzpatrick

Subjects: economics and finance, public choice theory, politics and public policy, public choice


The central thesis of this chapter is that the Lisbon Treaty – like the European Constitution before it – serves as a further step along an already well-established path towards increasing the gulf between citizens and decisions that affect their lives. Efforts aimed at reducing the democratic deficit via furthering the role of the European Parliament and increasing the role of majoritarian preferences are misplaced and inefficient. The European Union is becoming increasingly centralist and its allocation of competencies violates both economic principles and the democratically expressed volition of the citizens of Europe.

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