Table of Contents

Corruption and Conflicts of Interest

Corruption and Conflicts of Interest

A Comparative Law Approach

Studies in Comparative Law and Legal Culture series

Edited by Jean-Bernard Auby, Emmanuel Breen and Thomas Perroud

As in all periods of swift economic development and political upheaval, our era of globalization has brought corruption and conflicts of interest into the spotlight. This comprehensive study highlights the difficulties of devising global legislative and judicial responses to these issues.

Chapter 2: Regulatory authorities and conflicts of interest

Hubert Delzangles

Subjects: law - academic, comparative law, constitutional and administrative law, corruption and economic crime, public international law


Regulatory authorities are, more than other sectors of the government and for reasons of independence, particularly prone to conflicts of interest. Conflicts of interest are both the foundation and the main challenge of independent regulatory authorities (IRAs). In the first place, the independence of regulatory authorities in Europe was intended to be a response to the conflicts of interest that naturally arise from the way in which Member States intervene in the regulated markets. However, and this will be our main point, regulatory authorities are often accused of being captive to the market actors they are supposed to regulate. On the one hand, the close relationship between the regulatory authorities and the regulated markets can result in an assumption of conflicts of interest. On the other hand, the relationship that these authorities enjoy with public powers can also create certain suspicions towards conflicts of interest. To avoid this captive position and also for purely ethical reasons, several systems have been put in place to avoid conflicts of interest. The concept of Independent Regulatory Agencies was developed in the 19th century in the United States. It was the government's response to issues that had arisen in certain markets. These markets were prone to anti-competitive practices and tended to be highly concentrated. In order to fight such abusive behaviours and protect the public interest Congress decided to create Independent Regulatory Authorities.

You are not authenticated to view the full text of this chapter or article.

Elgaronline requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books or journals. Please login through your library system or with your personal username and password on the homepage.

Non-subscribers can freely search the site, view abstracts/ extracts and download selected front matter and introductory chapters for personal use.

Your library may not have purchased all subject areas. If you are authenticated and think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

Further information