Lawyers philosophise more than they think, though perhaps not when they think they are philosophising. They may make poor philosophers when they indulge in Reflexion auf eigenes Tun1 after office hours, recalling their first year jurisprudence course. But they often demonstrate fascinating wit and, indeed, wisdom in arguing their professional propos- als, i.e. when they are doing the job they are trained to do. This book teases out some fundamental questions about law with due regard to what lawyers think. But it does not necessarily frame these questions, nor does it answer them, in terms that lawyers would deem useful for daily practice. Avoiding both philosophical idiolect and dialect, i.e., the idio- syncrasies of a specific author, school or circle, it rephrases them in a language of broader contemplation than the solution of a case. It prefers to ask not only what the law is, but also why it makes sense against a background of sense that we seem to adopt. It thus targets a group of readers different from legal practicians, namely students for whom law is an area of academic research. They are the agents who intertwine deep thinking and practical wisdom. The point is whether this entanglement will usher in confusion or insight. If the latter, both philosophy and law may profit, though not without a number of conceptual translations. If the former, law will continue as just another default institution, philosophy as a set of intellectual puzzles. It should be obvious where I prefer to put my stakes.