Collective Dominance and Collusion

Collective Dominance and Collusion

Parallelism in EU and US Competition Law

New Horizons in Competition Law and Economics series

Marilena Filippelli

By examining the issue of collusion in EU and US competition law, this book suggests possible strategies for improving the antitrust enforcement against parallelism, by exploiting the most advanced achievements of economic analysis.

Concluding remarks: EU and US approach to the oligopoly problem: an economic-based trend toward convergence

Marilena Filippelli

Subjects: law - academic, competition and antitrust law


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