Table of Contents

The Elgar Companion to Ronald H. Coase

The Elgar Companion to Ronald H. Coase

Edited by Claude Ménard and Elodie Bertrand

Ronald H. Coase was one of the most innovative and provocative economists of the twentieth century. Besides his best known papers on ‘The Nature of the Firm’ and ‘The Problem of Social Cost’, he had a major role in the development of the field of law and economics, and made numerous influential contributions to topics including public utilities, regulation and the functioning of markets. In this comprehensive Companion, 31 leading economists, social scientists and legal scholars assess the impact of his work with particular reference to the research programs initiated, the influence on policymakers, and the challenge to conventional perspectives.

Chapter 19: Coase and the transaction cost approach to regulation

Marian W. Moszoro and Pablo T. Spiller

Subjects: economics and finance, history of economic thought, industrial organisation, institutional economics, law and economics, law - academic, law and economics


Network utilities – water and sewage, electricity, natural gas – are an essential element of modern societies. These utilities are characterized by large and non-redeployable (sunk) capital investment and limited area of service where they tend to be the single provider. Their natural monopoly features (i.e., multiple providers may render the service more expensive) and the socially sensitive nature of their services (i.e., politics comes into play) have led network utilities to face, starting around the second half of the nineteenth century – administratively, legislatively, or contractually – governmental regulation. At first, economic research on utility regulation focused on market failure: the limitation of monopoly pricing and negative externalities, as well as the proper incentives to invest in long-term assets. Coase’s multi-tariff marginal cost pricing prevailed in the academic debate (if not in practice) over average cost pricing or marginal cost pricing with governmental subsidy for investments. While his approach to externality regulation as a contractual issue unearthed the relevance of transaction costs, it failed to identify the interplay of transaction costs and political hazards faced by both public and private agents. Recent research points out how seemingly inefficient regulatory features (such a regulatory rigidities) reflect an efficient institutional adaptation to political hazards of opportunistic expropriation by the government and strategic challenges by interested third parties.

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