Table of Contents

Competition Law as Regulation

Competition Law as Regulation

ASCOLA Competition Law series

Edited by Josef Drexl and Fabiana Di Porto

To what extent should competition agencies act as market regulators? Competition Law as Regulation provides numerous insights from competition scholars on new trends at the interface of competition law and sector-specific regulation. By relying on the experiences of a considerable number of different jurisdictions, and applying a comparative approach to the topic, this book constitutes an important addition to international research on the interface of competition and regulation. It addresses the fundamental issues of the subject, and contributes to legal theory and practice. Topics discussed include foundations of the complex relationship of competition law and regulation, new forms of advocacy powers of competition agencies, competition law enforcement in regulated industries in general, information and telecommunications markets, and competition law as regulation in IP-related markets.

Chapter 4: New powers – new vulnerabilities? A critical analysis of market inquiries performed by competition authorities

Tamar Indig and Michal S. Gal

Subjects: economics and finance, law and economics, law - academic, competition and antitrust law, law and economics


In the past two decades the number of jurisdictions which have empowered their competition authorities to engage in market inquiries (MIs) has grown substantially. Although jurisdictions differ in the scope and procedure adopted for such studies, they all share an important common trait: the attempt to allocate the roots of limited competition in the studied market. Market studies differ from traditional competition law tools in their triggers, range, object, and the level of pro-activity of the competition authority. They are not triggered by a suspicion of anti-competitive conduct of specific firms, but rather allow the authority to use a broad prism which focuses on a wider set of potential obstacles to competition, including the authority’s own past conduct, in order to find ways to enhance competition. MIs entail many advantages. Yet bestowing this power upon a competition authority is not self-explanatory. Furthermore, it is far from costless. Beyond the direct costs imposed on both the authority and market participants, MIs often carry less tangible price tags. They raise a host of constitutional, democratic and practical issues that have not been thoroughly studied as of yet, and these are the focus of this chapter. In examining these issues, the chapter builds, inter alia, on the recent administrative law literature which focuses on multi-agency interactions. Accordingly, this chapter seeks to provide a synergetic analysis of MIs for the benefit of policymakers.

You are not authenticated to view the full text of this chapter or article.

Elgaronline requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books or journals. Please login through your library system or with your personal username and password on the homepage.

Non-subscribers can freely search the site, view abstracts/ extracts and download selected front matter and introductory chapters for personal use.

Your library may not have purchased all subject areas. If you are authenticated and think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

Further information