Table of Contents

Research Handbook on International Financial Crime

Research Handbook on International Financial Crime

Research Handbooks in Financial Law series

Edited by Barry Rider

A significant proportion of serious crime is economically motivated. Almost all financial crimes will be either motivated by greed, or the desire to cover up misconduct. This Handbook addresses financial crimes such as fraud, corruption and money laundering, and highlights both the risks presented by these crimes, as well as their impact on the economy. The contributors cover the practical issues on the topic on a transnational level, both in terms of the crimes and the steps taken to control them. They place an emphasis on the prevention, disruption and control of financial crime. They discuss, in eight parts, the nature and characteristics of economic and financial crime, the enterprise of crime, business crime, the financial sector at risk, fraud, corruption, the proceeds of financial and economic crime, and enforcement and control.

Chapter 32: Corruption – new strategies

Jesper Johnsøn

Subjects: economics and finance, financial economics and regulation, law - academic, corruption and economic crime, finance and banking law

Extract

International financial crimes has emerged as a popular research topic of late, undoubtedly due to the increased public demand for accountability and the need to fill state coffers following the financial crisis of 2007–08. This chapter provides an overview of how broader research on corruption and its control can inform more specific studies of international financial crimes, and how overarching strategies to mitigate corruption are changing due to new theoretical developments in the field. This chapter surveys selected policy-relevant literature. It focuses on the literature that has mushroomed since the beginning of the global anti-corruption movement in the mid-1990s, initially led by the World Bank and later also promoted by other international organisations such as the United Nations, the OECD, the European Commission, and so on. As shown below, no grand theory exists that students of corruption can readily apply to understand all of its facets. However, most prevailing anti-corruption strategies are based on a principal–agent view of corrupt transactions, rooted in economic theory. An analytical approach rooted in economics can understand micro-level corrupt transactions and forms of bureaucratic corruption, but is often blind to issues regarding political economy, informal institutions and power structures. This chapter proposes two new perspectives for research and strategy. First, historical institutionalism is a useful analytical approach to inform anti-corruption strategies, as it recognises that current choices are shaped by past actions, and the salience of institutions.

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