Game Theory and Public Policy, SECOND EDITION

Game Theory and Public Policy, SECOND EDITION

Roger A. McCain

This book provides a critical, selective review of concepts from game theory and their applications in public policy, and further suggests some modifications for some of the models (chiefly in cooperative game theory) to improve their applicability to economics and public policy.

Chapter 9: Recall, rationality and political economy

Roger A. McCain

Subjects: economics and finance, game theory, politics and public policy, public policy

Extract

It has been observed that much literature in game theory relies on simplifying assumptions that can frustrate the application of the theory, particularly to public policy. The objective of this chapter is to give arguments why several other assumptions are problematic and to sketch some possible alternatives. We will begin with a common (often tacit) assumption of noncooperative game theory and then proceed to explore two further issues of cooperative game theory and an ambiguity in the concept of rationality.

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