Academic Learning in Law

Academic Learning in Law

Theoretical Positions, Teaching Experiments and Learning Experiences

Edited by Bart van Klink and Ubaldus de Vries

This timely book calls for a critical re-evaluation of university legal education, with the particular aim of strengthening its academic nature. It emphasizes lecturers’ responsibility to challenge the assumptions students have about law, and the importance of putting law in a theoretical and social context that allows for critical reflection and sceptical detachment. In addition, the book reports upon teaching experiences and innovations, offering tools for teachers to strengthen the academic nature of legal education.

Chapter 12: Students’ perception and legal education

Gülriz Uygur

Subjects: law - academic, legal philosophy, legal theory, research methods in law, research methods, research methods in law


The relationship between ethical awareness and legal education can be discussed in different contexts. Here, I discuss it in the context of seeing injustice. Seeing injustice is important to lawyers for different reasons. In this chapter, my primary aim is to argue for a close relationship between seeing injustice and virtue. After elucidating the nature of this relationship, I will explain why legal education should include education in the ethical virtues and how this improves students’ ethical awareness. The focus lies in particular on the virtue of attention. I do this with an example of experiential learning, taken from my classroom practice. The question of how virtue can play a role in legal decision-making may be answered in different ways. Generally, the subject of virtue is discussed in the context of legal ethics. As Amalia Amaya argues, the role of virtue in legal ethics is accepted by most legal theorists. Hence, it is plausible to think that there is indeed a relationship between a good legal decision and the possession of virtue. Amaya states that: Good legal-decision making, particularly in hard cases, requires the possession of capacities that go beyond the ability to properly assess relevant consequences and the mere compliance with a number of duties. The possession of some character traits, such as prudence, courage, wisdom, or justice, is arguably conducive to good (justified) decisions as well as constitutive of the conception of a good judge, good lawyer, or a good prosecutor.

You are not authenticated to view the full text of this chapter or article.

Elgaronline requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books or journals. Please login through your library system or with your personal username and password on the homepage.

Non-subscribers can freely search the site, view abstracts/ extracts and download selected front matter and introductory chapters for personal use.

Your library may not have purchased all subject areas. If you are authenticated and think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

Further information