A Case for Constructive Conceptual Explanation
Elgar Studies in Legal Theory
Chapter 2: Constructive conceptual explanation
This chapter assesses the net impact of the objections introduced in the first chapter. While parts of these objections can be met, more importantly they reveal the need for analytical legal theorists to move beyond conceptual analysis of law and towards constructive conceptual explanation of law. Conceptual analysis attempts to uncover the implicit features of a particular culture’s self-understanding of law, and so is inherently conservative, while constructive conceptual explanation seeks to modify or develop new and improved conceptual explanations of law for use in characterizing and understanding the social reality of law.
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