A Case for Constructive Conceptual Explanation
Elgar Studies in Legal Theory
Conclusion: a look back and a look forward
Throughout this book I have defended the view that analytical jurisprudence need not proceed solely by identifying necessary features and relations of law, and even when it does, it can do so by means other than a priori analysis. I have argued that such a view can be supported by renewed attention to Hart’s philosophically-constructed concept of law, and in general, through development of the idea of constructive conceptual explanation. In Chapter 3 I also suggested that Hart’s philosophically-constructed concept of law can be understood as a set of seven interconnected theses about the nature of law. We should notice, however, that this is not the only way to understand Hart’s theory. Here I will present an important yet complementary alternative, as a means of showing the full range of roles contingency and continuity can play in legal theory. I should note that the aim of this concluding chapter is certainly not to offer the last word, but instead to show where future debates might lie.
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