Chapter 2: The Political Economy of Customary International Law
The Chapter deals with the economic analysis of customary international law. It aims to give an overview of the different approaches discussed in the literature and to highlight the virtues and the limits of social science analysis of customary international law. First, it discusses the formation of customary law and examines under which conditions customary norms evolve. The formation of customary international law is analysed from two perspectives. On the one hand, the Chapter takes a look at rational choice approaches explaining the formation of patterns of State conduct. On the other hand, it gives a brief introduction into the political economy of international judges, i.e. their strategies when identifying customary norms. Second, it addresses research on the effectiveness of customary international law, where it compares rational choice explanations with constructivist approaches.
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