The Law and Economics of the Environment

The Law and Economics of the Environment

Edited by Anthony Heyes

This outstanding book focuses on how economics can contribute to the design, implementation and appraisal of legal systems that create the ‘right’ incentives for environmental protection. The sixteen original and specially commissioned contributions – written by some of the leading names in their field – span many of the important areas of contemporary interest and employ case study material combined with theoretical, empirical and experimental research.

Chapter 1: Law and economics of the environment: an overview

Anthony Heyes

Subjects: economics and finance, environmental economics, environment, environmental economics, environmental law, environmental sociology, law - academic, environmental law


Anthony Heyes ‘Law’ – in its various shapes and forms – has always been central in society’s protection and management of its natural environment. The boundaries between legal, regulatory and other approaches to environmental policy are blurred. For current purposes a watertight definition or boundary of what constitutes ‘law and economics’ isn’t needed, and we don’t venture one: the book contains a set of chapters that fall within any reasonable definition.1 The coverage is not, of course, exhaustive. The discipline of economics has incentives as one of its central organizing principles, and this is arguably the defining feature of ‘the economic approach’ to thinking about law. This tradition is reflected in the chapters here. PROPERTY RIGHTS AND COASE The celebrated Coase Theorem dictates that under a particular set of assumptions – in particular in a world without transactions costs – decentralized bargaining will lead to the efficient use of resources. Provided there is a welldefined initial allocation of property rights in place, disputing parties will bargain until such efficiency is achieved regardless of what that initial allocation looks like. The logic is pleasing in its simplicity, and second nature to economists trained since the 1960s. Consider a world populated by a single polluting factory and a single household. If the factory owner has the right to pollute, the household will ‘bribe’ him to reduce his emissions down to the point at which the marginal private benefit to the householder of cleaner air just equals the factory owner’s marginal cost of abatement (to that point...

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