Trade Liberalization, Competition and the WTO

Trade Liberalization, Competition and the WTO

Edited by Chris Milner and Robert Read

The prospective WTO Millennium Round of negotiations will highlight critical economic issues regarding the application and implementation of the WTO rules to international trade in goods and services. In this book, a distinguished group of academic experts considers the agenda and areas of interest for the next Round in light of Seattle, the functions of the WTO and competition policy issues arising from trade liberalization.

Chapter 8: Trade Liberalization and State Aid in the European Union

David Collie

Subjects: economics and finance, international economics


David Collie In contrast to most other trade blocs, such as the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA), the European Union (EU) has supranational regulations on subsidies or state aid.1 In return for this supranational regulation of state aid, the member states of the EU have relinquished their right to use countervailing duties against the subsidies given by other member states, as permitted by Article IV of the GATT. Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty states that: ‘Any aid granted by a Member State or through state resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the common market.’ Although this appears to be a strong prohibition of state aid, Article 87(2) lists a number of exceptions that are always compatible with the common market while Article 87(3) lists a number of exceptions that may be exempted by the European Commission.2 Responsibility for the implementation of the regulations on state aid in the EC Treaty lies with the Directorate-General for Competition Policy of the European Commission (DG-IV). Under Article 88(3) of the EC Treaty, member states are required to notify DG-IV of any proposed state aid so that they can determine whether it qualifies for exemption. However, DGIV raises no objection in 80–90 per cent of cases and only reaches negative final decisions in 1–5...

You are not authenticated to view the full text of this chapter or article.

Elgaronline requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books or journals. Please login through your library system or with your personal username and password on the homepage.

Non-subscribers can freely search the site, view abstracts/ extracts and download selected front matter and introductory chapters for personal use.

Your library may not have purchased all subject areas. If you are authenticated and think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

Further information