Table of Contents

Research Handbook on Intellectual Property and Competition Law

Research Handbook on Intellectual Property and Competition Law

Elgar original reference

Edited by Josef Drexl

This comprehensive Handbook brings together contributions from American, Canadian, European, and Japanese writers to better explore the interface between competition and intellectual property law. Issues range from the fundamental to the specific, each considered from the angle of cartels, dominant positions, and mergers. Topics covered include, among others, technology licensing, the doctrine of exhaustion, network industries, innovation, patents, and copyright.

Chapter 6: Patent Pools – Policy and Problems

Hanns Ullrich

Subjects: economics and finance, law and economics, law - academic, competition and antitrust law, intellectual property law, law and economics


Hanns Ullrich 1 Introduction Contractual arrangements between two or more holders of a certain stock of patents for the joint exploitation of their exclusive rights vis-à-vis third parties are commonly referred to as patent pools. These may take various forms in accordance with the purpose of the pooling. Generally a distinction is made between arrangements involving centralization of the exploitation, on the one hand, by transfer of control to a joint venture or even an independent enterprise acting as an agent or on its own behalf and, on the other, by way of bundling individually held patents for licensing by one of the partners.1 While these differences are not totally irrelevant to an antitrust analysis, given that the form chosen may reflect the competitive strategy the pooling arrangement is to serve,2 its economically and analytically characteristic feature is that the exploitation of industrial property rights3 relating to the technology of two or more enterprises is made the subject of an agreement on the building of a joint 1 Recent legal literature on the organization of pools is scarce; antitrust literature tends to use a narrow definition by requiring central control over exploitation by either transfer of property or exclusive licensing to a central unit, and thus foregoes one of the essential criteria of antitrust legality, which is free parallel licensing by the partners; see Stumpf, Herbert and M. Groß (2005), Der Lizenzvertrag, Frankfurt am Main: Recht und Wirtschaft, 8th ed., notes 543 et seq.; Schulte, Hans-Jürgen (1971)...

You are not authenticated to view the full text of this chapter or article.

Elgaronline requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books or journals. Please login through your library system or with your personal username and password on the homepage.

Non-subscribers can freely search the site, view abstracts/ extracts and download selected front matter and introductory chapters for personal use.

Your library may not have purchased all subject areas. If you are authenticated and think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

Further information