Anarchy, State and Public Choice

Anarchy, State and Public Choice

New Thinking in Political Economy series

Edited by Edward Stringham

The book reprints the main articles from the 1972 volume Explorations in the Theory of Anarchy, and contains a response to each chapter, as well as new comments by Gordon Tullock, James Buchanan, Jeffrey Rogers Hummel and Peter Boettke. The younger economists are notably less pessimistic about markets and more pessimistic about government than their predecessors. Much of the new analysis suggests that private property rights and contracts can exist without government, and that even though problems exist, government does not seem to offer a solution. Might anarchy be the best choice after all? This provocative volume explores this issue in-depth and provides some interesting answers.

Chapter 18: Anarchism as a Progressive Research Program in Political Economy

Peter J. Boettke

Subjects: economics and finance, public choice theory, politics and public policy, public choice


* Peter J. Boettke Economic theory, since its first systemic treatment in Adam Smith’s An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, has clearly stressed the mutual benefits of voluntary trade. By specializing in production and offering the goods and services for exchange with others, both individuals and society will be made better off. The source of wealth is not the natural resources that lie in the land, or the conquests of foreign lands, but an expanding division of labor driven by voluntary exchange. Smith had established a presumption toward voluntarism in human interaction on consequentialist grounds. Individual liberty was not only right from a moral perspective, but would yield greater social benefits as well. However, from the beginning of economics it was argued that these benefits of voluntary exchange could only be realized if the presumption toward voluntarism was suspended in order to create the governmental institutions required to provide the framework within which voluntary exchange can be realized.1 Precisely how much the presumption toward voluntarism would need to be suspended in order to provide the framework for voluntary exchange has been one of the most contested issues in economics since the late nineteenth century. The theory of public goods, monopoly and market failure all contributed to expanding the acceptance of coercion and qualifying the presumption toward voluntarism among mainstream economists. It is important to remember that each of these arguments for qualifying the presumption have been met with counter-arguments by economists that have demonstrated that...

You are not authenticated to view the full text of this chapter or article.

Elgaronline requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books or journals. Please login through your library system or with your personal username and password on the homepage.

Non-subscribers can freely search the site, view abstracts/ extracts and download selected front matter and introductory chapters for personal use.

Your library may not have purchased all subject areas. If you are authenticated and think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

Further information