Why I, Too, Am Not a Conservative

Why I, Too, Am Not a Conservative

The Normative Vision of Classical Liberalism

James M. Buchanan

Nobel Laureate James Buchanan collects in this volume original and recent hard-to-find essays exploring liberalism and conservatism as distinct ways of looking at and thinking about the realm of human interaction. Classical liberalism is presented here as a coherent political and economic position, as distinguished from both modern liberalism and conservatism.

Chapter 5: The Equivocal Ethics of Liberalism

James M. Buchanan

Subjects: economics and finance, public choice theory, politics and public policy, public choice


INTRODUCTION To what extent are classical liberalism and welfare-state liberalism ethically compatible? In the stylized ethics of the marketplace, persons meet in a relationship of natural equality, with the ethics of reciprocation a critical element in insuring viability of the whole nexus. In stylized Christian ethics, by contrast, persons exhibit compassion, one toward another, when they meet, with acknowledged hierarchical assignments becoming critical in the direction for give and take. My aim in this chapter is to explore the necessary tension between these contrasting and familiar ethical perspectives. In so doing, I hope to be able to clarify ambiguities that cloud analysis and discussion in several related areas of inquiry, including economics, evolution, game theory, law, philosophy, politics and psychology. I propose to frame the discussion again in terms of the continuing and stillrelevant debate between Plato and Adam Smith as representatives of two presuppositions, that of a natural hierarchy among persons and that of a natural equality. This debate has been consistently confused through a failure to distinguish carefully between the positive and the normative versions of the presuppositions. Empirically, persons differ, one from another, along each of many dimensions. Acknowledgment of this elementary fact prejudices the positive argument in favor of Plato. But is there an overarching common dimension that allows the notion of a natural hierarchy to become meaningful? In the absence of such an acknowledged natural hierarchy, as exhibited in public attitudes, is it normatively permissible to presume the existence of such an ordering among persons...

You are not authenticated to view the full text of this chapter or article.

Elgaronline requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books or journals. Please login through your library system or with your personal username and password on the homepage.

Non-subscribers can freely search the site, view abstracts/ extracts and download selected front matter and introductory chapters for personal use.

Your library may not have purchased all subject areas. If you are authenticated and think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

Further information