Table of Contents

The Evolution of European Competition Law

The Evolution of European Competition Law

Whose Regulation, Which Competition?

ASCOLA Competition Law series

Edited by Hanns Ullrich

With contributions from leading scholars from all over Europe and the US, this book covers the major areas of substantive competition law from an evolutionary perspective. The leitmotiv of the book has been to assess the dividing line between safeguarding and regulating competition.

Comment: A short note on the generation of efficiencies in the context of the 'constitutional' principles of European competition law

Gustavo Ghidini

Subjects: law - academic, competition and antitrust law


Comment: A short note on the generation of efficiencies in the context of the ‘constitutional’ principles of European competition law Gustavo Ghidini* The subject matter of this workshop stimulates, inter alia, a reflection on the position and role of the generation of efficiencies in the framework of the ‘constitutional’ principles of EU competition law. First of all, of course, we must consider the paradigm of Article 81(3) of the EC Treaty – a basic paradigm which I assume (and as I will later try to argue) embodies a balance of interests which basically informs the whole process of anticompetitive assessment – from the earlier Treaty-based cartel law to the subsequent Merger Regulations. Now, Article 81(3) tells us precisely that an agreement that produces substantial, long-lasting efficiencies, even if they also benefit users (as indeed they must in order to be relevant), cannot be authorized if it is likely to eliminate competition from a substantial portion of the relevant market. Thus, Article 81(3) sets a double hierarchy between different general interests: a) the interest in preserving workable actual competition is foremost, and prevails over the – also general – interest in the generation of efficiencies, be they connected to superior productive, distributive or technological performance; b) in turn, the interests of the parties to the agreement are placed a step below those of consumers – the only ‘guaranteed’ social group. Further, how strongly the hierarchy is set may be seen from the fact that, even where the prospective efficiencies can be deemed to...

You are not authenticated to view the full text of this chapter or article.

Elgaronline requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books or journals. Please login through your library system or with your personal username and password on the homepage.

Non-subscribers can freely search the site, view abstracts/ extracts and download selected front matter and introductory chapters for personal use.

Your library may not have purchased all subject areas. If you are authenticated and think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

Further information