Money, Financial Intermediation and Governance

Money, Financial Intermediation and Governance

Dino Falaschetti and Michael J. Orlando

Dino Falaschetti and Michael Orlando unify the treatment of the many deeply related topics in money and banking in this wide-ranging book. By continually building on the assumption that economic actors are maximizers, they explain how monetary and financial services, as well as related governance mechanisms, influence economic performance. In this manner, Money, Financial Intermediation and Governance not only lets readers make sense of today’s monetary authorities and financial markets, it lets them see through superficial complexities to the fundamental influences that will shape those organizations for years to come.

Chapter 9: Is Monetary Policy Active?

Dino Falaschetti and Michael J. Orlando

Subjects: business and management, corporate governance, economics and finance, corporate governance, financial economics and regulation, money and banking


To breed an animal with the right to make promises – is not this the paradoxical task that nature has set itself in the case of man? (Friedrich Nietzsche, 1887) INTRODUCTION The last chapter’s analysis largely argues against activist monetary policy. We saw, for example, that reduced form evidence offers little guidance to activist policy. Moreover, even if policy could fully eliminate business cycles, consumers may place a negligible value on marginal increases in economic stability. The present chapter turns this analysis in a more positive direction. Here, we’ll address the important question of why, despite discouraging arguments against policy activism, monetary authorities can maintain a strong incentive to actively inflate. This paradox emerges from the problem of ‘time inconsistency’: The problem in a nutshell is as follows: The best policy plan has the property that after following the plan for a while, everybody agrees that there is a better alternative than to continuing the original plan. But, if a group of people cannot commit to its original plan, the ex ante best plan [that which initially appeared optimal] is not feasible. (Edward C. Prescott, quoted by Rolnick, 1996) We’ll argue that the ‘ex ante best plan’ is a policy that produces price stability. Notice, however, that once individuals anticipate such a policy, expectations in the Lucas supply curve are fixed. At this point, the monetary authority has an opportunity to trade inflation for employment (this opportunity does not exist before expectations are formed). Despite the optimality of...

You are not authenticated to view the full text of this chapter or article.

Elgaronline requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books or journals. Please login through your library system or with your personal username and password on the homepage.

Non-subscribers can freely search the site, view abstracts/ extracts and download selected front matter and introductory chapters for personal use.

Your library may not have purchased all subject areas. If you are authenticated and think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

Further information