The Law and Economics of Contingent Protection in the WTO

The Law and Economics of Contingent Protection in the WTO

Elgar International Economic Law series

Petros C. Mavroidis, Patrick A. Messerlin and Jasper M. Wauters

In this important book, three of the leading authors in the field of international economic law discuss the law and economics of the three most frequently used contingent protection instruments: anti-dumping, countervailing measures, and safeguards. When discussing countervailing measures, the authors also discuss legal challenges against prohibited and/or actionable subsidies. The authors’ choice is mandated by the fact that the effects of a subsidy cannot always be confined to the market of the WTO Member wishing to react against it. Assuming there are effects outside its market, an injured WTO Member can challenge the scheme as such before a WTO Panel. Taking the three agreements for granted as a starting point, the book provides comprehensive discussion of both the original contracts, and the case law that has substantially contributed to the understanding of these agreements.

Chapter 16: Conclusions

Petros C. Mavroidis, Patrick A. Messerlin and Jasper M. Wauters

Subjects: economics and finance, international economics, law - academic, international economic law, trade law


, we need not address the question whether an Article XXIV defence is available to the United States. Nor are we required to make a The regulation of safeguards in the WTO 487 It is important to recall that the parallelism principle as discussed in the various cases mentioned was clearly linked to the special case of free trade area partners or custom union members and the text of footnote 1. It would not be correct to say that the Appellate Body was suggesting that any country could impose safeguard measures on a selective basis as long as there was a parallelism between the imports examined and the imports targeted in the measure. A safeguard measure is not an anti-dumping or countervailing measure. The question only arises because an argument could be made on the basis of footnote 1 and the relationship between the Safeguards Agreement and Article XXIV of GATT 1994 that it would be legitimate to exclude such free trade area/customs union partner imports. Similarly, the parallelism principle has been applied in one other situation where the Safeguards Agreement itself explicitly provides for an exception to the MFN principle of Article 2.2, the case of negligible imports from developing countries under Article 9. We refer to our discussion of this matter below. In the absence of such an authorization from the SG Agreement itself or the GATT in general, there is no basis for not applying the measure on an MFN basis and the parallelism question thus does not...

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