Table of Contents

Competition and Regulation in the Postal and Delivery Sector

Competition and Regulation in the Postal and Delivery Sector

Advances in Regulatory Economics series

Edited by Michael A. Crew and Paul R. Kleindorfer

orldwide, postal and delivery economics has attracted considerable interest. Numerous questions have arisen, including the role of regulation, funding the Universal Service Obligation, postal reform in Europe, Asia and North America, the future of national postal operators, demand and pricing strategies, and the principles that should govern the introduction of competition. Collected here are responses to these questions in the form of 24 essays written by researchers, practitioners, and senior managers from throughout the world.

Chapter 12: National Postal Strategies after a Full Postal Market Opening

Gonzales d’Alcantara and Axel Gautier

Subjects: economics and finance, public sector economics

Extract

Gonzales d’Alcantara and Axel Gautier 1. INTRODUCTION In October 2006 the European Commission presented to the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers a proposal for a Directive1 modifying Directive 97/67/CE2 and 2002/39/EC3 to open fully the postal market in the European Union by January 1, 2009. In a vote on the proposal and amendments on July 11, 2007, the European Parliament modified this proposal with a few additional conditions, but postponing the date to 2011–13 (with most of the EU-15 members subject to the 2011 date and new members and countries like Greece and Luxembourg facing special conditions subject to the 2013 date). This proposal requires Full Postal Market Opening (FMO) in all EU member states and the obligation for all member states to provide a Universal Postal Service, including postal delivery every day, to every address and at an affordable price. The proposal foresees the possibility that losses for a National Postal Operator (PO) as a result of its Universal Service Obligation (USO) may need to be financed by various means, including a state subsidy. Let us assume that this Directive is also accepted by the European Parliament and that, within this context, all member states have to specify a well-defined USO, a corresponding financing mechanism and regulatory constraints. Such specifics will result from a national decision process involving three national players: the Incumbent (I) or historical Universal Service Provider (USP), an Entrant and a National Policy Maker (Regulator). We assume that the...

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