Terrorism, Security and the Power of Informal Networks

Terrorism, Security and the Power of Informal Networks

Edited by David Martin Jones, Ann Lane and Paul Schulte

This innovative work examines the concept of the informal network and its practical utility within the context of counterterrorism. Drawing together a range of practitioner and academic expertise it explores the character and evolution of informal networks, addressing the complex relationship between kinship groups, transnational linkages and the role that globalization and new technologies play in their formation and sustainability.

Chapter 8: Modeling Proliferation Networks

Bruno Gruselle

Subjects: politics and public policy, international politics, terrorism and security

Extract

Bruno Gruselle Several tonnes of centrifuge components were discovered on their way to Libya when the German ship BBC China was intercepted in October 2003, thus revealing the existence of a large-scale network in nuclear technology smuggling. Its founder, Dr Abdul Qader Khan, considered as the father of the Pakistani nuclear bomb, had succeeded in creating a commercial system designed to assist countries aspiring to the possession of nuclear weapons, in return for payment, making use of contacts woven within the framework of the Pakistani nuclear bomb program. This enterprise illustrates the development of a second-tier proliferation phenomenon by which developing countries mutually assist each other in their efforts to develop and possess nuclear weapons or missiles.1 Everything suggests that the Khan network extended beyond simple assistance to nuclear programs and contributed to setting up technical cooperation between its customers. For example, this is the case for the development of the Nodong missile, its Pakistani version (Ghauri) and the Iranian Shahab-3. Although attention has been focused on the Khan network, there is no doubt that several more or less interconnected systems were set up to bypass the non-proliferation system. Work done by the Iraqi Survey Group demonstrated that Saddam Hussein’s Iraq had set up a system designed to circumvent the embargo and acquire goods from other countries or foreign companies for use in its United Nations (UN)-prohibited programs. Similarly, the underground activities of the North Korean regime probably include the supply of proliferation technologies to customers such as Iran,...

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