Table of Contents

The Law and Economics of Class Actions in Europe

The Law and Economics of Class Actions in Europe

Lessons from America

New Horizons in Law and Economics series

Edited by Jürgen G. Backhaus, Alberto Cassone and Giovanni B. Ramello

This well-documented book discusses the power and limitations of class actions with insights and analysis from a panel of distinguished scholars. It pays special attention to the introduction and the applicability of such a legal device in European civil law countries. The book offers a broad legal and economic investigation, drawing insights from US judicial experience and giving a rigorous discussion of both the philosophical and constitutional aspects and the economic mechanisms and incentives set up by class actions.

Chapter 9: Punitive Damages and Class Actions

Francesco Parisi and Marta Silvia Cenini

Subjects: economics and finance, law and economics, law - academic, european law, law and economics

Extract

Francesco Parisi and Marta Silvia Cenini 1. INTRODUCTION Punitive damages (or exemplary damages, as they are called in the United Kingdom) are damages that are awarded in excess of the plaintiff’s actual harm when compensatory damages are insufficient to deter and redress wrongdoing. The law and economics literature (Polinsky and Shavell 1998; Shavell 2004) usually suggests that punitive damages1 should be awarded when a tortfeasor has a significant chance of escaping liability for the harm caused. The economic function of punitive damages is that of deterring undetectable torts and tortfeasors that strategically rely on imperfect enforcement. These conditions are often found when litigation costs are very high or when it is difficult for victims to identify who injured them. Punitive damages should offset the deterrence-diluting effect of the chance of escape from liability. Given this function, punitive damages should be determined by multiplying the harm caused by the reciprocal of the probability of being found liable. Mathematically, let’s consider the case of a unilateral accident and define the level of precaution undertaken by the prospective tortfeasor as x, which imposes a linear unitary cost w. As usual, p is the probability of creating an accident of gravity A. The probability of an accident is a function of x, with p' < 0 and p' > 0. The tortfeasor’s liability when the accident actually occurs is L. Given any potential accident situation i, the social objective is to minimize the social cost function, given by the sum of precaution costs and expected accident...

You are not authenticated to view the full text of this chapter or article.

Elgaronline requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books or journals. Please login through your library system or with your personal username and password on the homepage.

Non-subscribers can freely search the site, view abstracts/ extracts and download selected front matter and introductory chapters for personal use.

Your library may not have purchased all subject areas. If you are authenticated and think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

Further information