Table of Contents

Handbook on the Politics of Regulation

Handbook on the Politics of Regulation

Elgar original reference

Edited by David Levi-Faur

This unique Handbook offers the most up-to-date and comprehensive, state-of-the-art reviews of the politics of regulation. It presents and discusses the core theories and concepts of regulation in response to the rise of the regulatory state and regulatory capitalism, and in the context of the ‘golden age of regulation’. Its eleven sections include forty-eight chapters covering issues as diverse and varied as: theories of regulation; historical perspectives on regulation; regulation of old and new media; risk regulation, enforcement and compliance; better regulation; civil regulation; European regulatory governance; and global regulation. As a whole, it provides an essential point of reference for all those working on the political, social, and economic aspects of regulation.

Chapter 9: Beyond the Logic of the Market: Toward an Institutional Analysis of Regulatory Reforms

Marc Allen Eisner

Subjects: economics and finance, political economy, politics and public policy, political economy, public policy, regulation and governance


Marc Allen Eisner After nearly a century of regulatory expansion, the United States entered a period of regulatory reform in the mid-1970s. During the previous decade, the case for government regulation came under prolonged scrutiny. Academic analysts and activists from the consumer movement identified serious cases of regulatory failure and compiled case studies that reinforced earlier scholarly works on regulatory capture and life cycles (see Herring 1938; Huntington 1952; Bernstein 1955; Kolko 1963). The critique of regulation was not the sole property of the left. Chicago school economists were developing the economic theory of regulation, modeling regulation as a series of mutually beneficial exchanges between profit-maximizing firms and vote-maximizing legislators (see Stigler 1971). Despite the obvious ideological differences, there was a broad consensus that many regulations protected regulated interests, foisting the costs on to the public. As the arguments against regulation mounted, stagflation created a window of opportunity for policy change (see Derthick and Quirk 1985). Excessive regulation was linked – albeit often only rhetorically – to rising inflation, stagnant growth, and flailing competitiveness. Policymakers concluded that the costs of economic regulations often exceeded whatever benefits might be claimed. Deregulatory initiatives were successfully introduced in commercial banking, communications, and air and surface transportation. In some cases, these initiatives mandated the wholesale elimination of well-established regulatory agencies. When combined with the rejection of Keynesian demand management, the promotion of greater trade liberalization, and welfare reform, deregulation became one of the pillars of neoliberalism. If earlier policy regimes had vested authority in state institutions...

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