Table of Contents

Handbook on the Politics of Regulation

Handbook on the Politics of Regulation

Elgar original reference

Edited by David Levi-Faur

This unique Handbook offers the most up-to-date and comprehensive, state-of-the-art reviews of the politics of regulation. It presents and discusses the core theories and concepts of regulation in response to the rise of the regulatory state and regulatory capitalism, and in the context of the ‘golden age of regulation’. Its eleven sections include forty-eight chapters covering issues as diverse and varied as: theories of regulation; historical perspectives on regulation; regulation of old and new media; risk regulation, enforcement and compliance; better regulation; civil regulation; European regulatory governance; and global regulation. As a whole, it provides an essential point of reference for all those working on the political, social, and economic aspects of regulation.

Chapter 24: Five Models of Regulatory Compliance Motivation: Empirical Findings and Normative Implications

Yuval Feldman

Subjects: economics and finance, political economy, politics and public policy, political economy, public policy, regulation and governance


Yuval Feldman In recent years, the influence of psychology on legal policy making has been on the rise (for a review see Korobkin and Ulen 2000; Bilz and Nadler 2009). Among the various aspects of psychology discussed in the interaction between psychology and the law, motivation seems to be among the most important ones, albeit not among the ones most discussed. The focus of this chapter will be on the contribution of behavioral studies to the understanding of compliance motivation (e.g. MacCoun 1993). This chapter will suggest that five distinctive assumptions of human motivation can be identified among the existing regulatory models. After laying the ground for the differences between the models, the chapter will go on to discuss a few drawbacks to the suggested taxonomy. First, the mutual exclusivity of these models will be challenged, suggesting the complexity that the behaviorally informed legal policy maker might face. Second, as people may be motivated to comply with more than one motivation, targeting one motivation may cause an adverse effect on the other motivations. Third, by taking motivation into account when shaping regulation, the legal policy maker may be forced to speak with many voices as not everyone is motivated by the same motivation in every situation. With the limited ability to predict ex ante to which type of person a given regulation is targeted, the challenge of responsive regulation might prove to be especially difficult. The chapter will conclude with some preliminary suggestions for a responsive regulatory design, which would...

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