Table of Contents

Handbook on the Politics of Regulation

Handbook on the Politics of Regulation

Elgar original reference

Edited by David Levi-Faur

This unique Handbook offers the most up-to-date and comprehensive, state-of-the-art reviews of the politics of regulation. It presents and discusses the core theories and concepts of regulation in response to the rise of the regulatory state and regulatory capitalism, and in the context of the ‘golden age of regulation’. Its eleven sections include forty-eight chapters covering issues as diverse and varied as: theories of regulation; historical perspectives on regulation; regulation of old and new media; risk regulation, enforcement and compliance; better regulation; civil regulation; European regulatory governance; and global regulation. As a whole, it provides an essential point of reference for all those working on the political, social, and economic aspects of regulation.

Chapter 26: The New Regulatory Orthodoxy: A Critical Assessment

Tom Christensen and Per Lægreid

Subjects: economics and finance, political economy, politics and public policy, political economy, public policy, regulation and governance

Extract

Tom Christensen and Per Lægreid Over the last 25 years the traditional model of hierarchical and integrated government has been challenged by structural fragmentation inspired by the New Public Management (NPM) reforms (Christensen and Lægreid 2001; Pollitt et al. 2001; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004). A central aspect of this development in many countries has been a change in how regulatory activities are organized. Regulation based on central command and control from the top has been weakened in favour of more regulation by autonomous regulatory agencies (Levi-Faur 2005). The new international regulatory orthodoxy, enhanced by the emergence of a universal reform model, holds that the creation of autonomous agencies will improve regulatory performance and efficiency without having negative side-effects on accountability, transparency and democratic legitimacy (Majone 1994, 1997; Self 2000; Pollitt et al. 2004). This chapter asserts that these expectations are not established as evidence-based facts but need to be examined through empirical studies. The causes and effects of this development in regulatory policy are still unclear. We will focus on the dynamic interplay between the increase in the autonomy of regulatory agencies and political control of those agencies. The general research issues are the weak empirical foundations of regulatory reforms, the complex trade-off between political control and agency autonomy, the dual process of deregulation and reregulation, the problems of role-specialization and coordination, and the question of ‘smart practice’ in regulatory policy and practice. Our argument is that agencification and regulation operate in tandem. Autonomous organizations need regulation, and...

You are not authenticated to view the full text of this chapter or article.

Elgaronline requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books or journals. Please login through your library system or with your personal username and password on the homepage.

Non-subscribers can freely search the site, view abstracts/ extracts and download selected front matter and introductory chapters for personal use.

Your library may not have purchased all subject areas. If you are authenticated and think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

Further information