Table of Contents

Handbook on the Politics of Regulation

Handbook on the Politics of Regulation

Elgar original reference

Edited by David Levi-Faur

This unique Handbook offers the most up-to-date and comprehensive, state-of-the-art reviews of the politics of regulation. It presents and discusses the core theories and concepts of regulation in response to the rise of the regulatory state and regulatory capitalism, and in the context of the ‘golden age of regulation’. Its eleven sections include forty-eight chapters covering issues as diverse and varied as: theories of regulation; historical perspectives on regulation; regulation of old and new media; risk regulation, enforcement and compliance; better regulation; civil regulation; European regulatory governance; and global regulation. As a whole, it provides an essential point of reference for all those working on the political, social, and economic aspects of regulation.

Chapter 36: Voluntary Approaches to Regulation – Patterns, Causes and Effects

Annette Elisabeth Töller

Subjects: economics and finance, political economy, politics and public policy, political economy, public policy, regulation and governance


36 Voluntary approaches to regulation – patterns, causes, and effects Annette Elisabeth Töller The core idea of a Weberian conception of regulation is that the state adopts collectively binding rules which can be sanctioned by courts and, if necessary, implemented by the use of legitimate force. In the light of this conception, voluntary regulation provokes puzzlement. Here there are no binding rules, no role for courts, no forcible implementation by the state, and sometimes no public agency at all (see Kirton and Trebilcock 2004: 9); yet we call it ‘regulation’. The rapid ‘proliferation’ of such forms of ‘self-regulation in the shadow of the state’ is considered as a core element of the ‘new order of regulatory capitalism’ (Levi-Faur 2005: 27). Voluntary regulation can be defined as ‘rule structures . . . that seek to persuade firms to incur nontrivial costs of producing positive externalities beyond what the law requires of them’ (Potoski and Prakash 2009: ix). The term ‘voluntary regulation’ is clearly preferable to other terms such as ‘civil regulation’, ‘private regulation’, ‘cooperative regulation’, ‘negotiated regulation’, ‘third-party regulation’, ‘self-regulation’, ‘regulated regulation’, or ‘soft law’, for several reasons (see for example Gunningham and Rees 1997; Kirton and Trebilcock 2004; Porter and Ronit 2006: 42; Everett et al. 2008; LeviFaur, Chapter 1). First, most of these other terms refer to only part of the meaning of voluntary regulation. For example, with ‘civic’ or ‘civil’ regulation, civic actors (meaning societal but not business actors) play a role in some cases of voluntary regulation but not in...

You are not authenticated to view the full text of this chapter or article.

Elgaronline requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books or journals. Please login through your library system or with your personal username and password on the homepage.

Non-subscribers can freely search the site, view abstracts/ extracts and download selected front matter and introductory chapters for personal use.

Your library may not have purchased all subject areas. If you are authenticated and think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

Further information