Research Handbook on the Economics of Antitrust Law

Research Handbook on the Economics of Antitrust Law

Research Handbooks in Law and Economics series

Edited by Einer R. Elhauge

One might mistakenly think that the long tradition of economic analysis in antitrust law would mean there is little new to say. Yet the field is surprisingly dynamic and changing. The specially commissioned chapters in this landmark volume offer a rigorous analysis of the field’s most current and contentious issues.

Chapter 11: Antitrust Law in Global Markets

Anu Bradford

Subjects: economics and finance, competition policy, law and economics, law - academic, competition and antitrust law, law and economics


Anu Bradford* INTRODUCTION Multilateral corporations’ activities span across global markets. Yet antitrust laws regulating those activities remain national. Europeans can ban American companies from merging,1 tell American companies how to design their products,2 or determine what kind of discounts American companies are permitted to offer to their customers.3 Chinese can impose conditions on off-shore mergers.4 And Brazilians can insist on reviewing a transaction with minimal connections to the Brazilian market.5 As the global web of antitrust laws thickens, companies are forced to navigate an increasingly complex regulatory environment. The need to comply with multiple different domestic antitrust regimes exposes multinational corporations to additional transaction costs, delays, and uncertainty. Simultaneous application of many antitrust laws carries the risk of enforcement conflicts and is likely to lead to global overenforcement of antitrust laws. A lack of international antitrust regulation may also lead to antitrust protectionism if states underenforce their antitrust laws towards domestic corporations, while overenforcing those same laws towards foreign corporations.6 These concerns have sparked demands to move away from decentralized antitrust Thanks to Hanna Chung for outstanding research assistance. See, e.g., Commission Decision 2004/134 of 3 July 2001, Case No. COMP/M.2220 – General Electric/Honeywell, [2004] O.J. L48/1 (hereinafter ‘GE/Honeywell Commission Decision’). 2 See, e.g., Case T-204/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm’n, [2007] E.C.R. II-03601, paras 231–3 (requiring Microsoft to design their products to have greater interoperability with competitors); Press Release, Antitrust: Commission Confirms Sending a Statement of Objections to Microsoft on the Tying of Internet Explorer to Windows, 17...

You are not authenticated to view the full text of this chapter or article.

Elgaronline requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books or journals. Please login through your library system or with your personal username and password on the homepage.

Non-subscribers can freely search the site, view abstracts/ extracts and download selected front matter and introductory chapters for personal use.

Your library may not have purchased all subject areas. If you are authenticated and think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

Further information