Elgar original reference
Edited by Albert A. Foer and Jonathan W. Cuneo
A right without a remedy is no right. A famous early statement of this fundamental of the common law came in the English case of Ashby v. White in 1703: If the plaintiff has a right, he must of necessity have a means to vindicate and maintain it, and a remedy if he is injured in the exercise or enjoyment of it, and, indeed it is a vain thing to imagine a right without a remedy; for want of right and want of remedy are reciprocal. . .1 As market economies have displaced various state-dominated regimes, the idea of antitrust has spread remarkably.2 Temporally, this expansion has been explosive since the fall of the Soviet Union. Its geographic extent is now nearly universal. Today there are well over one hundred jurisdictions in which laws regulate anticompetitive behavior such as collusion or abuse of corporate dominance. Even China, a Communist polity, now has a new and substantial competition law. The principal thrust of the movement toward competition laws has been to create market-based regimes in which most economic decisions are made by private persons and entities complying with (or perhaps manipulating) the laws of supply and demand. In most of the world’s antitrust jurisdictions, ironically, the government itself has maintained a monopoly or virtual monopoly over the implementation of competition law. If there is a violation of competition law, the government decides whether to prosecute. Private parties such as competitors, suppliers, or customers may voice complaints to the government, but they may...