Table of Contents

Competition Policy and Regulation

Competition Policy and Regulation

Recent Developments in China, the US and Europe

Edited by Michael Faure and Xinzhu Zhang

This unique book considers competition policy and regulation in light of the recent introduction of the anti-monopoly law in China. It addresses the relevance of competition policy for China from a broad theoretical and practical perspective, bringing together lawyers and economists from China, Europe and the US to provide an integrated law and economics approach.

Chapter 4: Critical Issues in the Enforcement of the Anti-Monopoly Law in China: A Law and Economics Perspective

Roger Van den Bergh and Michael Faure

Subjects: development studies, development economics, law and development, economics and finance, competition policy, development economics, law - academic, international economic law, trade law, law and development


Roger Van den Bergh and Michael Faure* 4.1 INTRODUCTION Since 30 August 2007, China has a long awaited Anti-Monopoly Law. The law entered into force one year later, on 1 August 2008. However, the formal entry into force has not answered all questions with respect to the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law (‘AML’ or the ‘Act’). Some of the questions that still arise as far as the implementation of the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law is concerned relate to exactly how this Act will be implemented, what precise administrative structures will be put in place and what type of enforcement mechanisms will be applied.1 So far, it seems that the competence to implement the Chinese AntiMonopoly Law will be shared by three authorities, the State Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC), the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and the Ministry of Commerce (MOC). These are three ministerial-level departments within the central government (Guo Wu Yuan, CG). The most recently adopted documents by the central government specify that the three authorities will have different responsibilities. Roughly, the SAIC will deal with anti-competitive agreements, abuse of dominant position and administrative monopolistic behaviour. Their competence would however exclude price-related anticompetitive activities. The NDRC would take charge of price-related monopolistic activities whereas the MOC would become competent to investigate merger and anti-competitive activities in transnational trade. Legal doctrine in China had suggested the creation of one single antitrust authority under the responsibility of the central government. The fact that now three separate entities will be created of...

You are not authenticated to view the full text of this chapter or article.

Elgaronline requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books or journals. Please login through your library system or with your personal username and password on the homepage.

Non-subscribers can freely search the site, view abstracts/ extracts and download selected front matter and introductory chapters for personal use.

Your library may not have purchased all subject areas. If you are authenticated and think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

Further information