The Dynamics of Global Economic Governance

The Dynamics of Global Economic Governance

The Financial Crisis, the OECD, and the Politics of International Tax Cooperation

Richard Eccleston

This book focuses on international taxation and examines how the financial crisis prompted renewed attempts to enhance international tax transparency and confront tax havens. It highlights the complexity of international regime change and the significance of national and financial interests, international organizations, domestic politics and the emerging G20 leaders forum in this process.

Conclusion: regime dynamics and the sustainability of international tax cooperation

Richard Eccleston

Subjects: economics and finance, political economy, politics and public policy, political economy, regulation and governance


The financial crisis that engulfed global markets in late 2007 continues to represent both a challenge and an opportunity for global economic governance. As of early 2012 the global economic outlook was far from certain and the prospects of restoring the 30 million jobs or the estimated 45 per cent of global wealth that have been destroyed since 2007 seem remote, as advanced industrial economies struggle under the weight of spiralling public debt and political malaise (ILO 2011; Davies 2009). Yet on a more optimistic note the severity of the crisis has acted as a catalyst for unprecedented international cooperation in developing and implementing a collective response to the severe challenges facing the global economy. At the broadest level this book assesses the prospects for achieving effective and sustainable global economic governance in the aftermath of the financial crisis. Using international taxation as a case study, the book has described and evaluated how the acute challenges facing the global economy since the financial crisis began in 2007 and the resultant political and financial pressures that have been exerted on national governments have influenced patterns of global governance and international cooperation.

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