Table of Contents

The Elgar Companion to Public Choice, Second Edition

The Elgar Companion to Public Choice, Second Edition

Edited by William F. Shughart II, Laura Razzolini and Michael Reksulak

The Companion lays out a comprehensive history of the field and, in five additional parts, it explores public choice contributions to the study of the origins of the state, the organization of political activity, the analysis of decision-making in non-market institutions, the examination of tribal governance and to modeling and predicting the behavior of international organizations and transnational terrorism.

Chapter 15: Monetary policy

Rob Roy McGregor

Subjects: economics and finance, austrian economics, public choice theory, politics and public policy, public choice

Extract

Monetary policy involves actions taken by central banks to affect the level of interest rates and the amounts of money and credit available in an economy. These actions are intended to promote national economic goals such as price stability and sustainable economic growth. Many central banks now operate with a considerable degree of policymaking independence, and many also have inflation targeting mandates. These monetary authorities must nevertheless be mindful of the political context in which they make their policy decisions. This chapter covers important aspects of the political environment that central banks often confront when formulating monetary policy, and addresses both how and why central banks occasionally respond to political pressures. Moreover, monetary policy decisions are often made by committees that hold regular meetings in which members vote on a one-dimensional issue (the degree of ease or tightness of monetary policy). The availability of data on the decisions of monetary policy committees and the preferences of the committee’s individual members provide excellent opportunities to study partisan loyalties and partisan ideologies at the level of individual committee members and the mechanisms by which these committees aggregate preferences to reach a policy decision. Because the analysis of committee decision-making is of independent interest in the field of public choice, this chapter concludes with a discussion of this intriguing branch of research on monetary policy.

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