Comparative Law and Society

Comparative Law and Society

Research Handbooks in Comparative Law series

Edited by David S. Clark

Comparative Law and Society, part of the Research Handbooks in Comparative Law series, is a pioneering volume that comprises 19 original essays written by expert authors from across the world. This innovative handbook offers both a history of the field of comparative law and society and a thorough exploration of its methods, disciplines, and major issues, presenting the most comprehensive look into this contemporary field to date.

Chapter 1: History of Comparative Law and Society

David S. Clark

Subjects: law - academic, comparative law, law and society


David S. Clark* 1 1.1 INTRODUCTION Comparative Law Comparative law is as old as the existence of law. It arose with the first complaint of injustice directed against human action justified by a legal rule. The complainer, not having that law on her side, had to rely on a rule existing outside the actor’s legal system, perhaps on a higher law. Ancient illustrations of law and justice may be of significance to theologians, philosophers or shamans. However, other than a legal anthropologist’s interest in preliterate human societies, most comparatists today would not consider historical examples older than three millennia and much of that consideration is about classical European legal systems. Nevertheless, modern legal comparatists are continuing to push the boundaries of their discipline outward, intruding on sister fields in the social sciences and humanities—from economics to rhetoric—and expanding their consideration to ancient use of legal comparison in China and other parts of Asia. The modern view is that comparison is inherent to humans and probably to other species. This insight comes from diverse disciplines ranging from social psychology to human evolutionary genetics.1 Social comparison is how we make sense of the world in which we live and even understand ourselves. Legal comparison concerns that part of social reality involving laws and legal institutions. From this perspective, comparison does not need to be justified any more than rationality requires justification. Consciously rational comparison will involve aims and methods, but intuitive comparison may be subconscious. In thinking about legal norms,...

You are not authenticated to view the full text of this chapter or article.

Elgaronline requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books or journals. Please login through your library system or with your personal username and password on the homepage.

Non-subscribers can freely search the site, view abstracts/ extracts and download selected front matter and introductory chapters for personal use.

Your library may not have purchased all subject areas. If you are authenticated and think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

Further information