Table of Contents

Handbook on the Economics of Reciprocity and Social Enterprise

Handbook on the Economics of Reciprocity and Social Enterprise

Elgar original reference

Edited by Luigino Bruni and Stefano Zamagni

The recent era of economic turbulence has generated a growing enthusiasm for an increase in new and original economic insights based around the concepts of reciprocity and social enterprise. This stimulating and thought-provoking Handbook not only encourages and supports this growth, but also emphasises and expands upon new topics and issues within the economics discourse.

Chapter 38: The economics of corporate social responsibility

Lorenzo Sacconi

Subjects: economics and finance, behavioural and experimental economics, economic psychology, public sector economics, politics and public policy, social entrepreneurship, social policy and sociology, economics of social policy


Over the past two decades, corporate social responsibility (CSR) has been a focal subject for scholars in management studies, business ethics, and the law. More recently, however, economists have also started to pay attention to CSR in both popular newspapers and academic journals. As early as 2005, The Economist acknowledged the spectacular growth of company CSR initiatives throughout the world, involving companies, business associations, stakeholders representative groups, NGOs, universities, international organizations, and yet others. What struck The Economist as especially disturbing – in line with a famous Milton Friedman’s dictum of the 1970s – was that Boards of Directors, insufficiently committed to making profits for their shareholders, were instead engaging in ‘pernicious benevolence’ by being philanthropic with money taken not from their own pockets but from those of the corporate shareholders. What in fact this view indicated was that CSR is a philanthropic activity that ‘altruistic’ managers undertake by misusing corporate money, which as such, is in contrast with profit maximization. According to this view, CSR was a peculiar manifestation of managerial self-dealing: managers used company funds for the self-satisfaction of their own arbitrary moral preferences.

You are not authenticated to view the full text of this chapter or article.

Elgaronline requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books or journals. Please login through your library system or with your personal username and password on the homepage.

Non-subscribers can freely search the site, view abstracts/ extracts and download selected front matter and introductory chapters for personal use.

Your library may not have purchased all subject areas. If you are authenticated and think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

Further information