Table of Contents

Encyclopedia of Law and Economics

Encyclopedia of Law and Economics

Edited by Gerrit De Geest

    The second, expanded edition of the acclaimed Encyclopedia represents a major update of the most authoritative reference work in the field of law and economics and the nine print volumes are now released online as a single integrated product.

    The Encyclopedia provides balanced and comprehensive coverage of the major domain in law and economics, including: criminal law, regulation, property law, contract law, tort law, labor and employment law, antitrust law, procedural law, and the production of legal rules. Each theme or volume is overseen by a leading scholar and each of the 156 entries is prepared by an expert in the field, providing an in-depth and authoritative overview of the individual topic, combined with an exhaustive bibliography, allowing users to access and filter the entire corpus of literature in law and economics.

    As with the print edition, the Encyclopedia is unique in serving both as an entry point and a platform for advanced research. The online edition is enhanced with Elgaronline’s powerful search tools, facilitating the search for key terms across the entire Encyclopedia, whilst the browse function allows users to move seamlessly between the volumes. These elements combine to create a powerful research tool for any researcher or scholar in the field of law and economics.

    Index

    Edited by Chris William Sanchirico

    Subjects: economics and finance, law and economics, law - academic, law and economics

    [In: Volume 8, Chris William Sanchirico (ed) Procedural Law and Economics]

    • Abrams, D. 127 , 131

    • absent class members see class action

    • Acemoglu, D. 317

    • adversarial versus inquisitorial justice 1 18

      • adverse selection and opt-out, and intra-class conflict 75 7

      • and attorney-client confidentiality 58

      • centralized versus decentralized evidence production 7 11

      • comparison using model of litigation between two parties 5 7 , 14

      • competing experts and decision making 15

      • cost and variance, tradeoff between 10 11

      • definitions and comparisons 5 11

      • differences between 1 3

      • evidence, theoretical models 232 3

      • experimental tests of sophistication 14 15

      • future research 16

      • incentive alignment problem 14

      • and institutional organization 3

      • model assumptions 3 4

      • naïve decision makers and evidence production 11 12 , 15 , 16

      • principal-agent problem 11 , 13 , 16

      • sophisticated decision makers and tradeoff between cost of evidence and accuracy 12 14 , 15 , 16

      • theoretical literature 11 14

    • Antonovics, K. 122

    • Anwar, S. 122

    • appeal and supreme courts 19 51

      • case space and distinguishing practice 23 4

      • case-by-case adjudication 32 4

      • civil law legal systems, precedent in 25 6

      • common law precedential practices 21

      • common law precedential practices and horizontal stare decisis 21 4

      • constitutional system, models of adjudication embedded in 42 5

      • convergence to compromise rule 24

      • and criminal procedure 139 40

      • empirical studies of stare decisis 24 5 , 31

      • fact space and adjudication 29

      • information-based explanation of horizontal stare decisis 23

      • issue-by-issue adjudication 32 4

      • judges’ reputation concerns and horizontal stare decisis 23 , 24

      • judicial accuracy and Condorcet Jury Theorem 28 , 29 , 32

      • and judicial preferences and separability 29

      • judicial review effects on administrative agencies 42 3 , 45

      • median justice rule 27 , 28 , 29 , 30

      • overruling precedent 24

      • political model of doctrine 36 7

      • political model for horizontal stare decisis 22 3

      • and political theory model of legislation 20 , 26 7 , 41

      • precedential practices 21 6 , 36 7

      • p. 508sentencing decisions and separation of powers game 44

      • separation of powers models 42 5

      • separation of powers models, empirical studies 45

      • see also judicial organization and administration; US Court of Appeals; US Supreme Court

    • appeal and supreme courts, collegiality 26 34

      • adjudication and doctrinal paradox 32 4

      • adjudication models 28

      • of appellate courts, reasons for 27 8

      • and competing opinions 29 30

      • and consistency and coherence 31 2 , 33

      • and one-dimensional spatial preferences in policy 26 7

      • and panel effects 30 31

      • policy choice on collegial courts 28 30

      • and sincere versus sophisticated voting 34

      • voting protocols in collegial courts 32 4

    • appeal and supreme courts, hierarchical organization 34 42

      • and discretionary review 41 2

      • and doctrinal structure 35 8 , 39

      • and doctrinal structure, and CART estimation technique 38

      • and lower court compliance with higher courts 35 41

      • and political agency models 38 9

      • reasons for 34 5

      • and team models of error correction 39 41

      • and team models of error correction, and cases selected for review 40 41

      • and team models of error correction, and defendant’s type 40

    • Atkins, R. 124 , 126

    • attorney-client confidentiality 52 66

      • accuracy and primary activity incentives 59 62

      • and adversarial versus inquisitorial justice 58

      • capacity to conceal information produced by an attorney, effect of 61 2

      • and competition between interested parties 57 8 , 63 4

      • confidentiality of information shared or generated during litigation over completed acts 55 7

      • confidentiality of information shared prior to contemplated act 54 5 , 56 7

      • confidentiality and strategic revelation of information to courts 57 9

      • p. 509equilibrium decision on use of legal services 59 , 60

      • future research 60 61 , 64 5

      • legal advice and strategic revelation 53 9

      • and litigation costs 62 4

      • and litigation costs, and distortion created in markets for legal goods and services 63 4

      • litigation costs, and dynamic quality of law 64 5

      • and litigation costs, and propensity for and timing of settlement 64

      • social welfare effects of legal information production and exchange 59 65

      • social welfare value of confidentiality protection 53 9

      • unfavorable information, risk of discovering and effects on incentives 61

      • work-product doctrine 52

    • attorneys

      • experience and career paths, and criminal procedure 131

      • settlement negotiation 441 3

    • client confidentiality see attorney-client confidentiality

    • Coase, R. 105

    • Coffee, J. 68 , 70 , 72 , 73 , 74 , 77 , 78

    • Cohen, Laurence 223

    • Cohen, Linda 36 7 , 43 , 45

    • Cohen, M. 312 13

    • collegiality see appeal and supreme courts, collegiality

    • commerce law and cost-exportation theory 106 7

    • common law system

      • and civil law, differences between, in judicial organization and administration 317 19

      • and enforcement of contractual choice of law 103 4

      • precedential practices and horizontal stare decisis 21 4

      • see also civil law system

    • compensation scheme for plaintiffs’ lawyers 442 3

    • competition

      • between interested parties, and attorney-client confidentiality 57 8 , 63 4

      • jurisdictional see jurisdictional competition

    • confessions

      • economics of 378 84

      • false, and admissibility rules 381

      • reasons for 378 81

      • see also self-incrimination, privilege against

    • confidentiality see attorney-client confidentiality

    • conflict of laws and choice of laws 85 115

      • adhesion contracts 103

      • Allstate Insurance Co v. Hague 107

      • ‘balance of state interests’ approach 90 , 91

      • choice-of-law approach in practice 94 6

      • and choice-of-law monitoring and precedents 93

      • commerce law and cost-exportation theory 106 7

      • common law and enforcement of contractual choice of law 103 4

      • comparative regulatory advantages and forum law 88 9

      • conflict of laws problem 87 96

      • constitutional law 106 8

      • contract validity issues 91 2

      • Cooley v. Board of Wardens 106

      • corporate internal affairs rule 105 6

      • CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America 107

      • Edgar v. Mite Corp 107

      • escape devices 86

      • federal law 108

      • First Restatement of Conflicts 85 6 , 89 , 91 , 92 , 93 , 94 , 95 , 96

      • foreign law, reasons for and against choosing 87 90

      • forum law, costs and benefits of 87 9

      • Home Insurance v. Dick 89

      • inefficiency and forum shopping 88

      • information asymmetry and protection of contracting parties 103 , 104

      • interest analysis 89 91 , 100

      • interstate compacts 93 4

      • jurisdictional competition and contractual choice of law 101 2 , 105 , 106

      • jurisdictional competition and evolutionary theories 101 2

      • jurisdictional competition and herd behavior 101 2

      • Leflar’s ‘better law’ 89 , 90 , 94 , 95 , 96

      • legislators’ weak incentives to innovate 99

      • mandatory rules, evasion of 102

      • ‘most significant relationship’ test 89 , 90

      • recovery-favoring modern approach 94 6

      • rule versus standard-based approaches 89 92

      • p. 512rule-based approaches, coordination problems with 92 4

      • Second Restatement of Conflicts 90 , 95 , 103 4

      • state competition incentives for corporate law 98 9

      • state competition incentives for lawyers 99 100 , 106

      • state competition incentives for non-corporate law 100

      • statutory law and enforcement of contractual choice of law 104 5

      • Supreme Council of the Royal Arcanum v. Green 107 8

      • territorial approach, criticism of 85 6

    • conflict of laws and choice of laws, contractual choice of law 96 108

    • constitutional system

      • conflict of laws and choice of laws 106 8

      • courts and judicial organization and administration 330

      • and criminal procedure 123

      • models of adjudication embedded in 42 5

    • Cover, A. 313 , 314

    • Cover, R. 106

    • Cox, J. 73 , 79

    • Crain, W. 100

    • Craswell, R. 476

    • Crémer, J. 256

    • criminal procedure 116 44

      • appeals 139 40

      • Apprendi v. New Jersey 138

      • and attorney experience and career paths 131

      • bail amounts and probability of re-arrest 127

      • bail and pretrial release 126 7

      • Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents 123

      • charge bargaining 128 , 129 30

      • civil lawsuits by jail and prison inmates 140

      • and constitutional law 123

      • criminal punishment statistics 116

      • death penalty and plea bargaining 129

      • death penalty reversal rates 140

      • defendant characteristics and prosecutor preferences 130

      • demographic characteristics and sentencing 134 5

      • discretionary sentencing 131 2

      • economic studies and criminology, differences between 117 18

      • exclusionary rule 122 6

      • exclusionary rule and defendant’s statement 124 5

      • exclusionary rule, effect on crime rates 124

      • federal sentencing grid 132

      • indeterminate sentencing, abandonment of 134

      • inmate litigation 140

      • p. 513judicial characteristics and sentencing 136

      • judicial discretion, regulation of 131 9

      • jury tral rights and mandatory sentencing 138

      • mandatory sentencing 128 9 , 132 , 133 , 137 9

      • Mapp v. Ohio 124

      • Miranda case, and confession rates 125 6

      • Miranda case, effects of 124 6

      • Miranda case, effects on police behavior 125

      • parole boards 134

      • plea bargaining and length of sentence 128

      • plea bargaining and pretrial release 126 7

      • police discretion and regulation of investigations 118 26

      • policing levels and crime rates 118 19

      • political affiliation of judge, and sentencing 136 7

      • post-conviction litigation 139 40

      • prosecutor behavior 127 31

      • and prosecutors’ career patterns 130 31

      • punishment imposition 131 40

      • recidivism and sentencing 134 , 136

      • and right to silence 373 4

      • sentencing guidelines and prosecutors’ discretion 128 30 , 131 2

      • sentencing and inter-judge disparity 132 3 , 139

      • three-strikes laws 129

      • truth-in-sentencing laws 134

      • United States v. Booker 138 9

    • defendants

      • advantage theory, and trial selection theory 502 3

      • asymmetric information and informational advantage for 495 6 , 499 500 , 502

      • characteristics, and prosecutor preferences 130

      • innocent, an indirect benefit of right to silence 377

      • insolvent defendant model, settlement negotiation 446

      • strategic search models and possibility of pro-plaintiff or pro-defendant bias 231 2

      • see also plaintiffs; prosecutor

    • Deffains, B. 461

    • Demsetz, H. 2

    • Deneckere, R. 248 , 416

    • detection avoidance and enforcement theory 145 87

      • complementarities, accounting for, across orders of detection avoidance 179 80

      • conventional approach to enforcement 148 9

      • conventional enforcement model with detection avoidance added 150 54

      • and court’s inherent powers 146 7

      • detection avoidance, theoretical possibility of preventing increases in 176 8

      • p. 514deterrence mechanics, effects on 150 54 , 156

      • evidence of reasonableness of destruction 147

      • and firms’ document retention policies 147

      • incorporation of detection avoidance and effect on enforcement model 148 54

      • Malik’s qualification, and counter qualifications 155 , 161 7 , 168 9

      • misconduct penalties 146 7

      • policies directed at detection avoidance 152 4

      • regulation overview 145 7

      • regulation scope 147

      • responsive increases in detection avoidance, effects of 156

      • responsive increases in detection avoidance, effects when violation is a continuous variable 157 61

      • social cost-benefit accounting, effect of responsive increases in detection avoidance 161 7

      • social cost-benefit analysis in conventional approach 149 , 151 2 , 154

      • technological approach 147 , 180 85

      • technological approach, implementing 183 5

      • technological approach, mechanics of 180 82

      • and US Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 146 , 147

      • see also evidence, theoretical models

    • detection avoidance and enforcement theory, recursivity of detection avoidance 170 80

      • nature of, and substitution effect 171 3

      • practical assessment of state involvement 178 9

      • practical import of 170 71

    • discretionary sentencing, criminal procedure 131 2

    • p. 515diversity jurisdiction 330

    • Dixit, A. 6

    • Djankov, S. 318

    • doctrinal structure

      • and adjudication paradox 32 4

      • and appeal and supreme courts, hierarchical organization 35 8 , 39

      • and CART estimation technique 38

      • and self-incrimination, privilege against 370 76

    • documentary evidence

      • firms’ document retention policies 147

      • and self-incrimination, privilege against 373

    • Epstein, L. 313

    • Eskridge, W. 43 , 45

    • Europe

      • ‘most significant relationship’ test 90

      • see also France; UK

    • Evans, D. 77 , 81

    • evidence

      • evidentiary misconduct see detection avoidance and enforcement theory

      • generation following plea bargaining 459

      • see also asymmetric information; imperfect information; information

    • evidence, theoretical models 203 70

      • adversarial versus inquisitorial justice 232 3

      • assume-the-worst rule 225 6 , 229 30 , 232

      • binary cost interpretation of omission models 231 , 242 3

      • character evidence and conduct 251

      • contracts scholarship, questioning emphasis on verifiability in 251 3

      • damages accuracy assessment, effect on incentives 251

      • endogenous cost signaling 248 56

      • exogenous cost signaling 244 8

      • exogenous cost signaling, applied to legal evidence 245

      • exogenous cost signaling, and comparison to emission models 246 8

      • false evidence, costs of 243

      • feasible presentation 230 , 233

      • feasible presentation, lingering problems in 240 42

      • Herring v. New York 227

      • infinite or zero cost 230 31 , 246

      • infinite or zero cost, illusory solution of adopting 242 3

      • p. 516jury’s role, historical evolution of 265 6

      • and law and economics of litigation 204 7

      • link to primary activities 233

      • Lipman and Seppi on partial provability 234 8 , 243

      • multiple informed parties with conflicting interests 226 7 , 233

      • omission models 223 43

      • partial provability in a multi-party context 233 8

      • partial provability in a multi-party context, partial solution of 243

      • and plaintiff victory, probability of 205 7

      • predictive evidence 251

      • presumptions and litigation-primary activity feedback 253 5

      • private information, correlated 256 66

      • private information, correlated, implementing caution without endogenous cost signaling 259 62

      • proof burdens’ allocations and strategic complementarities in evidentiary choice 255 6

      • single party model 224 6 , 233 4

      • and spoliation 225 6

      • strategic search models and possibility of pro-plaintiff or pro-defendant bias 231 2

      • subset reporting 227 , 228 9

      • subset reporting, no-lying assumption 239 41

      • third-party information, efficacy of 257 9

      • trace evidence as byproduct of conduct 251

      • trial error minimization and deterrence maximization, link between 250 51

      • truth revelation versus primary activity incentive setting 249 50

      • truth-consistent presentation 227 30 , 241

      • truth-consistent presentation, no-lying assumption 239 40

      • see also detection avoidance and enforcement theory

    • evidence, theoretical models, pure probabilistic deduction, Bayes’ rule 208 11 , 254

    • Iaryczower, M. 325

    • ideology views, and judicial organization and administration 314 16 , 323 4

    • p. 519imperfect information

      • asymmetric information comparisons, and settlement negotiation 435 8

      • model, settlement negotiation 410 11

      • see also asymmetric information; evidence; information; private information

    • information

      • acquiring from experts, and settlement negotiation 464

      • acquiring from other player, and settlement negotiation 462 4

      • capacity to conceal information produced by an attorney, effect of 61 2

      • confidentiality of information shared prior to contemplated act 54 5 , 56 7

      • confidentiality and strategic revelation of information to courts 57 9

      • role in settlement negotiation 393 401

      • unfavorable, risk of discovering and effects on incentives 61

      • see also asymmetric information; evidence; imperfect information; private information

    • inmate litigation 140

    • Innes, R. 162 3 , 167

    • innocent defendants, indirect benefit of right to silence 377

    • inquisitorial justice see adversarial versus inquisitorial justice

    • insolvent defendant model 446

    • interrogation, coercive, and self-incrimination, privilege against 381 2

    • interstate compacts 93 4

    • Issacharoff, S. 199 , 200

    • Japan, judicial independence 322 , 323 4 , 326

    • Jehl, S. 222

    • Jensen, M. 328

    • Johnson, S. 315

    • judges

      • characteristics and sentencing 136

      • discretion, regulation of 131 9

      • judicial accuracy and Condorcet Jury Theorem 28 , 29 , 32

      • judicial preferences and separability 29

      • judicial review, bolstering, and class action 79 80

      • judicial review effects on administrative agencies 42 3 , 45

      • political affiliation of, and sentencing 136 7

      • promotion of efficiency, and incentive to sue 481

      • reputation concerns and horizontal stare decisis 23 , 24

      • sentencing and inter-judge disparity 132 3 , 139

      • and settlement negotiation 443 4

    • litigation costs

      • and attorney-client confidentiality 62 4

      • and distortion created in markets for legal goods and services 63 4

      • and dynamic quality of law 64 5

    • plea bargaining

    • Porter, R. 93

    • positive-expected-value suits

      • and settlement negotiation 451 2

      • see also negative-expected-value suits

    • preclusion law 349 65

      • asymmetric litigation investment and nonparty preclusion rule 363

      • Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation 356

      • claim preclusion 350 51

      • claim preclusion by agreement 351 2

      • claim preclusion scope 352 3

      • complete preclusion system 362 3

      • costs associated with nonmutual issue preclusion 356 8

      • costs associated with nonparty issue preclusion 362

      • error cost reduction and claim preclusion 352

      • future research 365

      • issue preclusion 350 , 351 , 354 65

      • legal right test and claim preclusion 353

      • mutuality doctrine and issue preclusion 355

      • nonmutual issue preclusion 355 61 , 362

      • nonparty preclusion 361 5

      • Parklane Hosiery v. Shore 356 , 357

      • settlement effects and issue preclusion 358 61

      • settlement effects and nonparty preclusion rule 364 5

      • stare decisis and issue preclusion, difference between 354 5 , 359

      • Taylor v. Sturgell 361

      • transaction cost reduction and claim preclusion 352

      • transaction test and claim preclusion 353

      • trial effects and nonmutuality doctrine 356 8

      • trial effects and nonparty preclusion 361 4

    • products liability cases, and trial selection theory 500 501 , 503

    • prosecutor

      • behavior, and criminal procedure 127 31

      • career patterns, and criminal procedure 130 31

      • disclosure requirements from, and self-incrimination, privilege against 377

      • discretion and sentencing guidelines 128 30 , 131 2

      • preferences, and defendant characteristics 130

      • see also defendants; plaintiffs

    • pure probabilistic deduction see evidence, theoretical models, pure probabilistic deduction

    • self-incrimination, privilege against, right to silence

      • as anti-pooling device 367 70

      • as applying to every phase of the criminal process 371 2

      • and asymmetrical information 367 70 , 380 , 382

      • as belonging to persons, not corporations 375 6

      • as confined to criminal trials 373 4

      • as confined to same-sovereign prosecutions 374

      • and false positives and negatives 367

      • and intermediate cases 368

      • as legal regime 368

      • and privilege against adverse inferences to some civil cases 377 8

      • problem of removing from trial 371 2

      • as restricted to testimonial evidence 372 3

      • and social welfare 376 7

      • utility of 367 76

    • social welfare

      • effects of legal information production and exchange 59 65

      • and right to silence 376 7

      • value of confidentiality protection 53 9

    • state involvement

      • ‘balance of state interests’ approach 90 , 91

      • and recursivity of detection avoidance 178 9

    • suing incentives see social versus private incentive to sue

    • Sullivan, J. 72

    • Sunstein, C. 31

    • sweetheart settlements 73 5 , 78 , 79 , 80

    • Symeonides, S. 86

    • Triantis, G. 251

    • Tribe, L. 221

    • p. 530Trubek, D. 297

    • truth revelation versus primary activity incentive setting 249 50

    • truth-consistent presentation

    • UK

      • English rule see English rule

      • judicial review 321

      • jury system 332

      • legal structures, evolution of 319

      • ‘payment into court’ settlement 289

      • Vita Food Products Inc. v. Unus Shipping Co. 104

      • see also Europe

    • US Court of Appeals

      • Chavez v. Illinois State Police (racial disparity) 119

      • see also appeal and supreme courts